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THE CAREER OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
 The legal concept of state sovereign immunity has been 
controversial since the ratification of the Constitution in 
1789. In 1793, the Supreme Court ruled that the states had 
no sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment reversed this 
ruling about the Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment 
itself has also been very controversial. We study the 
history and development of sovereign immunity jurisprudence 
from the founding of the United States until the present 
time. 
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THE CAREER OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
MASTER’S THESIS, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
FALL 2007 
 
WILLIAM ANDERSON LABACH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 State sovereign immunity is the legal doctrine that  
 
consent is required in order to sue a state. This doctrine  
 
is generally considered by the Courts to be a  
 
constitutional matter. Many legal commentators and several  
 
Supreme Court Justices consider it to be a doctrine of the  
 
common law subject to abolition or modification by the  
 
Congress at any time. This paper will trace the historical  
 
development of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and  
 
its incorporation by the Rehnquist Court in the Tenth and  
 
Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution. It is the thesis  
 
of this paper that state sovereign immunity is of  
 
constitutional dimension and that it stands on its own as a  
 
constitutional doctrine whether incorporated in the Tenth  
 
and Eleventh Amendments or not.   
 
ON CONSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT 
 
 For the purposes of this thesis, a government is a  
 
person or a group of persons with an organizational  
 
structure which controls a significant portion of the  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
surface of the Earth generally by military force. We may  
 
refer to this land as Blackacre. The powers of government  
 
are arbitrary and unlimited. As people do not feel  
 
comfortable living in a land with unlimited governmental  
 
powers over them, the powers of government are usually  
 
harnessed by a Constitution. A Constitution limits  
 
governmental power and sets up a structure for government.  
 
The people of Blackacre consider the limitations on the  
 
power of government to be their constitutional rights. The  
 
people benefiting from constitutional rights are generally  
 
referred to as citizens. Not all persons located in  
 
Blackacre are necessarily citizens. Persons in Blackacre  
 
who are not citizens may include visitors, trespassers,  
 
invaders, and persons there for a special purpose.  
 
The Constitution is not a source of laws regulating  
 
relations between people. Laws regulating behavior, in a  
 
government similar to that of the United States, are  
 
determined by a Legislature constituted for that purpose.  
 
The Legislature passes the laws the people of Blackacre  
 
live by. The Legislature enacts tax laws and is solely in  
 
charge of spending funds belonging to the government. The  
 
laws of Blackacre are in full force and effect only there.  
 
Another government, such as Greenacre, may choose to either  
 
2 
 
 
 
 
accept or reject a law of Blackacre. Acceptance of a law of  
 
Blackacre by Greenacre is an act of comity. The laws  
 
of Blackacre are generally interpreted by the branch of  
 
government referred to as the Judiciary. Members of the  
 
Judiciary are Judges.  
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CHAPTER I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION IN 1789 
 
 The colonies inherited the doctrine of sovereign  
 
immunity from England where it had been the invariable  
 
rule ever since the reign of King Edward I (1272-1307),  
 
known as “Longshanks.” This doctrine was never a matter of  
 
the common law, that is judge made law1, but was a  
 
prerogative of the royal sovereign. The doctrine was  
 
inherited by the colonies, but that is not the basis for  
 
its continued validity in the United States Constitutional  
 
system. Sovereign immunity of the states was included in  
 
the Articles of Confederation, the nation’s first  
 
constitution, in Article II: “Each state retains its  
 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,  
 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation  
 
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress  
 
assembled.” The Articles of Confederation, ratified in  
 
1781, were never repealed, but were supplanted or  
 
constructively amended2 by the Constitution. The  
 
                                                 
1 In the Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States at 
pp. 170-171 we find the term “common law” defined as follows: Common 
law is the body of judge-made law that was administered in the royal 
courts of England (King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Exchequer 
Chamber) – in contrast with other bodies of English law administered in 
different courts, such as equity, admiralty, canon law, and the 
customary law of the borough and manorial courts. William Blackstone 
described the common law as the general customary law of the realm as 
interpreted by the royal judges, the “living oracles” of the law. 
4 
 
 
 
 
2 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, Lawrence, Kansas: University of 
Kansas Press (1985), 279.  
Constitution did not mention sovereign immunity. It thus  
 
did not modify the sovereign immunity of the states.  
 
THE TREATY OF PARIS 
 
The Treaty of Paris ending the Revolutionary War in  
 
1783 provided in Article I: 
 
His Brittanic Majesty acknowledges the said United 
States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free 
sovereign and independent states, that he treats with 
them as such, and for himself, his heirs, and 
successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, 
propriety, and territorial rights of the same and 
every part thereof.3 
 
 Sovereignty of the states thus became a constitutional  
 
matter due to Article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution  
 
which provides that treaties shall be the supreme law of  
 
the land: 
 
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.   
 
The meaning and characteristics of sovereignty in 1783 
 
can be ascertained from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the  
 
Laws of England, which was the preeminent authority on  
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3 Defining Documents of the United States Web site, 
http://www.classbrain.com/artteenst/publish/article_33.shtml. 
English law for the founding generation. “[T]he law  
 
attributes to the king the attribute of sovereignty or pre- 
 
eminence. ... Hence it is, that no suit can be brought  
 
against the king, even in civil matters, because no court  
 
can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction  
 
implies superiority of power: authority to try would be  
 
vain and idle, without an authority to redress; and the  
 
sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless that  
 
court had power to command the execution of it.”4 
 
There was a case in Pennsylvania about sovereign  
 
immunity before the ratification of the Articles of  
 
Confederation and the Constitution. The case of Nathan v.  
 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1 U.S. 77, 1 Dallas 77 (1781)  
 
concerned an attachment of imported clothing in  
 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania which belonged to the  
 
Commonwealth of Virginia. The Court of Common Pleas of  
 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania held that Virginia was  
 
immune from the processes of Pennsylvania by virtue of its  
 
sovereign immunity. 
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4 William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England, Dublin: 
Company of Booksellers (1775), 241.  
CHAPTER II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CHISHOLM CASE 
 
The United States Government under the Articles of  
 
Confederation had no taxing power. Instead, it relied on  
 
requisitions paid by the states. The requisition of  
 
1786, for example, was supposed to generate $3.0 million  
 
Dollars from the states but only $663.00 was paid. This  
 
left the United States in an insolvent position. There were  
 
proposals in 1781 and 1783 to allow a 5% tax or impost on  
 
exports but Rhode Island and then Virginia vetoed these in  
 
1781 followed by New York in 1783. In Righteous Anger at  
 
the Wicked States: The Meaning of the Founders’  
 
Constitution, Calvin H. Johnson states his thesis as  
 
follows: 
 
[T]hat the Constitution was a radically nationalizing 
vector compellingly explained by the righteous anger 
of the Founders at the misdeeds of the states. The 
anger explains both key steps in the transformation 
and also the strength of the drive for change. 
 
The Founders were angry at the states for their 
defaults on the requisitions and for their vetoes of 
the federal impost. The Founders believed that the 
failure of requisitions was due to evil and shameful 
acts by the states. Rhode Island’s veto of the 1781 
impost was the “quintessence of villainy.” Rhode 
Island was a detestable little corner of the Continent 
that injured the United States more than the worth of 
the whole state. Both Rhode Island and New York, it 
was said at the time, should rest in Hell.5 
 
The Founders expressed their anger at the states in  
                                                 
5 Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Meaning of the Founders’ Constitution 
(2005), 2 – 3. 
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immoderate, even religious terms. “United, we stand,  
 
divided we fall” had been the motto that held together the  
 
drive for independence and made victory possible. The  
 
states were betraying the sacred cause of the United  
 
States. The states had betrayed George Washington’s army at  
 
Valley Forge and they were continuing their betrayal of the  
 
common cause. The action of the states in their defaults of  
 
requisitions and in veto of the impost was sin, disease,  
 
w
 
ickedness, and vice, not easily forgiven.6 
John Jay was one of the Peace Commissioners who  
 
negotiated the Treaty of Paris. Article Four of the treaty  
 
provided as follows: “It is agreed that creditors on either  
 
side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery  
 
of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts  
 
heretofore contracted.”7 There were other provisions of the  
 
treaty providing relief for Loyalists and persons holding  
 
Revolutionary War debts. According to Sandra Frances  
 
VanBurkleo, “Jay particularly fulminated against the  
 
violations of the Definitive Treaty with Britain and the  
 
compacts supporting Revolutionary War debts. His own  
 
promises underpinned many such agreements. Of greater  
 
moment, however, were national ‘honor, justice, and  
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Defining Documents of the United States Web site. 
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interest.’ Time and time again, he advocated broader powers  
 
of ‘coercion’ so that administrators and judges might  
 
enforce these ‘most salutary and constitutional objects.’”8 
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8 Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honor, Justice, and Interest: John Jay’s 
Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench”, 42, in 
Scott Douglas Gerber (ed.), Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John 
Marshall (1998). 
CHAPTER III. THE SUPREME COURT RULES THAT THE STATES HAVE 
NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA (1793) 
 
 The states had sovereign immunity at least from 1783  
 
until the present as a constitutional matter and not due to  
 
a common law tradition inherited from England. The issue of  
 
sovereign immunity came up almost immediately in the first  
 
major case decided by the United States Supreme Court,  
 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dallas 419, 1 L.Ed. 440  
 
(1793).  
 
 The background facts of the case of Chisholm v.  
 
Georgia are not given in the report of Alexander J. Dallas  
 
at 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dallas 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793). They are  
 
found in Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement by  
 
Doyle Mathis.9 In 1777 the Executive Council of Georgia  
 
authorized Thomas Stone and Edward Davies of Savannah, as  
 
commissioners of the state, to purchase supplies from  
 
Robert Farquhar, a merchant of Charleston, South Carolina.  
 
They purchased a considerable quantity of merchandise from  
 
Farquhar for which he was to receive $169,613.33 in South  
 
Carolina currency. The date of delivery of the merchandise  
 
was November 3, 1777. On December 2, 1777 Farquhar demanded  
 
payment. Georgia paid Stone and Davies for the merchandise,  
 
however, they became insolvent and never paid Farquhar who  
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9 Doyle Mathis, “Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement”, 
Journal of American History 54 (June 1967), 20-23. 
 
died in a maritime accident during January 1784. Alexander  
 
Chisholm became executor of Farquhar’s estate. After  
 
efforts to collect the debt failed, Chisholm filed suit  
 
against the state of Georgia in the United States Circuit  
 
Court for the District of Georgia in an unreported case  
 
styled Farquhar’s Executor v. Georgia. Governor Edward  
 
Telfair answered the suit stating that Georgia was: 
 
a free, sovereign and independent State, and that the 
said State of Georgia cannot be drawn  or compelled   
...to answer against the will of the said State of 
Georgia, before any Justices of the federal Circuit 
Court for the District of Georgia or before any Court 
of Law or Equity whatsoever.10 
 
The case was decided in the October, 1791 term of the  
 
Circuit Court at Augusta, Georgia. James Iredell of the  
 
United States Supreme Court on Circuit and Nathaniel  
 
Pendleton of the United States District Court for Georgia  
 
agreed that Georgia could not be sued by a resident of  
 
South Carolina in the Circuit Court. The case was  
 
dismissed. Chisholm then brought an original action against  
 
Georgia in the Supreme Court of the United States.  
 
 In a surprising four to one decision, the Supreme  
 
Court ruled against Georgia and decided the states had no  
 
sovereign immunity. The Justices in the majority were Chief  
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10 Case File, Records of the United States Circuit Court, District of 
Georgia, Case A, Box 1. 
Justice John Jay of New York, John Blair of Virginia,  
 
William Cushing of Massachusetts, and James Wilson of  
 
Pennsylvania. James Iredell of North Carolina wrote a  
 
dissenting opinion.  
 
ON SOVEREIGNTY 
  
The Chisholm case concerns the concept of sovereignty.  
 
The definition of sovereignty we shall use is the standard  
 
one taken from Black’s Law Dictionary: 
 
Sovereignty. The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable 
power by which any independent state is governed; 
supreme political authority; ... 
 
The power to do everything in a state without 
accountability, - to make laws, to execute and to 
apply them, to impose and collect taxes and levy 
contributions, to make war or peace, to form treaties 
of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and 
the like. Story, Const. § 207.11 
 
 In a very deceptive manner, Justices Jay and Wilson  
 
use the concept of “popular sovereignty” in place of  
 
sovereignty in their Chisholm opinions. Popular sovereignty 
 
is a legal fiction and not a form of governmental or  
 
territorial sovereignty at all. Popular sovereignty was  
 
adopted by the Federalists to argue for the ratification of  
 
the Constitution. The concept arose in England to replace  
 
the legal fiction known as the divine right of kings in the  
 
                                                 
12 
 
 
 
 
11 Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 
St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. (1968). 
reign of King Charles I during the first half of the  
 
Seventeenth Century. Parliament needed a new ideology to  
 
justify placing the authority of the King below that of the  
 
people and its representatives. It did this through a new  
 
fiction that God authorized government through the people  
 
and set the people above their governors. According to this  
 
new idea of popular sovereignty, the people of the nation,  
 
exercising their God-given powers chose a government by  
 
kings in hereditary succession. The fiction of popular  
 
sovereignty strained credulity as much as the fiction of  
 
the divine right of kings. The idea of “the people” is an  
 
abstraction and no authorization of government by God ever  
 
occurred.12 
 
The notion of popular sovereignty explained the novel  
 
American system of sovereignty split between the federal  
 
government and the states. According to this theory, all  
 
sovereignty was in the people who allotted some to the  
 
federal government, some to the states, and retained some  
 
for themselves. This is the argument developed by James  
 
Wilson and used by the Federalists to explain the  
 
Constitution.  
 
In a debate at the Pennsylvania Ratification 
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12 Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People, New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, (1988), 56-59. 
Convention November 24, 1787, James Wilson said “[t]hat the  
 
supreme power, therefore, should be vested in the people,  
 
is in my judgment the great panacea of human politics. It  
 
is a power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in  
 
its nature, and indefinite in its extent.”13 On the  
 
tombstones for Wilson at Edenton, North Carolina and Christ  
 
Church in Philadelphia is the quote: "That the Supreme  
 
Power, therefore, should be vested in the People, is, in my  
 
judgment, the great panacea of human politics.”14 Popular  
 
sovereignty is not a legal doctrine and is not a part of  
 
the law of the United States. It is just political  
 
philosophy. 
 
THE PRIMARY EVIDENCE USUALLY CITED AS INDICATING THE 
INTENTIONS OF THE FOUNDERS CONCERNING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
 Several important statements concerning sovereign  
 
immunity were made at the times of the Constitutional  
 
Convention and the subsequent ratifying conventions. These  
 
statements are well known and cited by almost all writers  
 
on the subject.  
 
Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist 81, “It is  
 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to  
 
                                                 
13 John Bach McMaster and Frederick D. Stone (eds.), Pennsylvania and 
the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, Philadelphia: Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania (1888), 230.  
14 
 
 
 
 
14 Burton Alva Conkle, "The James Wilson Memorial," American Law 
Register 55 (1907), 7. 
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the  
 
general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the  
 
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now  
 
enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union.  
 
Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in  
 
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the  
 
states.”15  
 
James Madison in the Virginia Ratifying Convention  
 
June 20, 1788 debated the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction of  
 
suits between a state and citizens of another State as  
 
follows: “Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state  
 
and citizens of another state is much objected to, and  
 
perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of  
 
individuals to call any state into court. The only  
 
operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to  
 
bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before  
 
the federal court. This will give satisfaction to  
 
individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom a state  
 
may have a claim, being dissatisfied with the state  
 
courts.”16 
 
John Marshall, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention,  
                                                 
15 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist 
Papers (Clinton Rossiter ed.), New York: Penguin Books USA Inc. (1961), 
487-488. 
15 
 
 
 
 
16 Jonathan Elliot (ed.), The Debates in the Several States Conventions 
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Washington: Printed for 
the editor, 4 volumes, (1836), vol. 3, 533. 
 
on June 20, 1788 argued similarly about citizen-state  
 
diversity jurisdiction: 
 
With respect to disputes between a state and the 
citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has been 
decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no 
gentleman will think that a state will be called at 
the bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at 
present? Are there not many cases in which the 
legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state 
is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the 
sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The 
intent is, to enable states to recover claims of 
individuals residing in other states. I contend this 
construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, 
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be 
defendant -- if an individual cannot proceed to obtain 
judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a 
state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be 
avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state 
defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff. 
If this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to 
the system on that account? If an individual has a 
just claim against any particular state, is it to be 
presumed that, on application to its legislature, he 
will not obtain satisfaction? But how could a state 
recover any claim from a citizen of another state, 
without the establishment of these tribunals?17 
 
The Rhode Island Ratifying Convention proclaimed that  
 
“It is declared by the Convention, that the judicial  
 
power of the United States, in cases where the state may be  
 
a party, does not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to  
 
authorize any suit by any person against a state.”18 The  
 
Convention sought an amendment “to remove all doubts and  
 
controversies respecting the same.”19 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 555-556. 
18 1 Elliot’s Debates, 336. 
16 
 
 
 
 
19 Ibid. 
 
 The New York Ratifying Convention also made known its  
 
understanding “[t]hat the judicial power of the United  
 
States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not  
 
extend to Criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit  
 
against a state.”20 The convention proceeded to ratify the  
 
Constitution “[u]nder these impressions, and declaring that  
 
the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and  
 
that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the  
 
said Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments  
 
which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution  
 
will receive an early and mature consideration.”21 
 
 The clause concerning citizens-state diversity  
 
jurisdiction was proposed by a Committee of Detail of the  
 
Constitutional Convention consisting of John Rutledge,  
 
Edmund Randolph, Oliver Ellsworth, Nathaniel Gorham, and  
 
James Wilson. Its inclusion in the Constitution occurred  
 
without debate or discussion among the delegates at large  
 
so far as surviving records indicate. 
 
THE JAY OPINION 
 
 John Jay was born December 14, 1745 in New York City  
 
to a wealthy merchant family. He graduated from King’s  
 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 329. 
17 
 
 
 
 
21 Ibid. 
College (now Columbia University) in 1764. He was an  
 
attorney and served in the Continental Congress. In 1782 he  
 
served as one of the commissioners to draft the peace  
 
treaty with England. He was a nationalist thinker. His  
 
nationalist views led to his rejection as a New York  
 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.22  
 
President Washington appointed Jay the first Chief Justice  
 
of the United States Supreme Court in 1789. 
 
Chief Justice Jay in his Opinion first considered the  
 
sense in which Georgia is a sovereign state. He ignored the  
 
Articles of Confederation and the Treaty of Paris which  
 
both established governmental sovereignty for Georgia. He  
 
did admit “thirteen sovereignties were considered as  
 
emerged from the principles of the Revolution.” He  
 
declared “at the Revolution the sovereignty devolved on  
 
the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the  
 
country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless  
 
the African slaves among us may be so called) and have none  
 
to govern but themselves.”23 He said sovereign immunity was  
 
based on feudalism which never existed in the United States  
 
and had no application here. He defined sovereignty as “the  
 
right to govern” which was not the definition in general  
 
                                                 
22 Walter Stahr, John Jay: Founding Father, New York: Hambledon and 
London (2005), 245-246.  
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use. He cleverly substituted the fiction of popular  
 
sovereignty for the legal concept of sovereignty so his  
 
opinion would read as if it made some sense.  
 
Jay was of the opinion that Georgia, by being a party  
 
to the Constitution, consented to be suable by individual  
 
citizens of another state. This argument is based on  
 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution setting forth  
 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts as follows: 
 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority; - to all cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party; - to controversies between 
two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of 
another State - between Citizens of different states, 
- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different states, and between a State 
or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens 
or Subjects. 
 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to Law and fact, with such 
Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress 
shall make. 
 
Jay argued for a non-existent principle of judicial  
 
symmetry that if a state can sue an individual then an  
 
individual can sue a state. This is, in fact, a correct  
 
interpretation of Article III, Section 2 of the  
19 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitution cited above as far as jurisdiction is  
 
concerned. The problem with Jay’s argument is that a suit  
 
of an individual against a state for ordinary debt does not  
 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted due to  
 
sovereign immunity. Article III, Section 2 is just a  
 
jurisdictional provision for the federal courts. The  
 
Constitution established the federal Courts as Courts of  
 
limited jurisdiction. This is very confusing to non- 
 
lawyers. To get a suit into a federal court one must  
 
establish and prove jurisdiction. Once having established  
 
jurisdiction, one must also have a claim upon which relief  
 
may be granted in order to have a case which will survive  
 
dismissal. Article III, Section 2 does not establish  
 
substantive law making states liable to suit in federal  
 
court for debt. No such substantive law existed. Commenting  
 
on the Chisholm case, Akhil Reed Amar said: “This was a  
 
bold leap. Under the common law of Georgia and South  
 
Carolina – and indeed, of every other state in 1792, it  
 
would appear – no damages lay for a breach of contract by a  
 
state itself. At common law, such a contract, though  
 
morally binding upon a state, was not legally enforceable  
 
against it in a damage suit unless the state itself  
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consented to the suit.”24  
 
Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General of the United States  
 
and attorney for Chisholm, writing to James Madison,  
 
expressed his not very flattering opinion of Jay’s judicial  
 
abilities as follows: “An opinion which has long been  
 
entertained by others is riveted in my breast concerning  
 
the C.J. He has a nervous and imposing elocution, and  
 
striking lineaments of face, well adapted to his real  
 
character. He is clear, too, in the expression of his  
 
ideas, but that they do not abound on legal subjects has  
 
been proved to my conviction. In two judgments which he  
 
gave last week, one of which was written, there was no  
 
method, no legal principle, no system of reasoning!”25  
 
Walter Stahr, a biographer of Jay, analyzed Jay’s 
 
Chisholm Opinion as follows: 
 
Its main deficiency, from a modern perspective, is 
that it assumed that, if there was jurisdiction, if 
the Supreme Court had authority to hear a case against 
a state, there was a cause of action, a right to 
recover on a private contract with a state. But before 
the Constitution it was universally agreed that a 
private party could not recover on a contract with a 
state. As Hamilton put it in the Federalist, 
“contracts between a nation and individuals are only 
binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have 
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no pretensions to a compulsive force.” Jay did not 
discuss the source of the right to sue a state in 
contract, but it seems he assumed the right was found 
in a kind of federal common law, that there was now a 
federal cause of action on contracts made by states, 
even though there had been none before the 
Constitution.26  
 
VanBurkleo characterized Jay’s Chisholm Opinion as  
 
“curiously wistful” and “nonlegalistic”.27 She further  
 
discussed his judicial career as follows: “The chief  
 
justice, moreover, has been dismissed as a ‘trifling’  
 
student of domestic law whose court escaped mediocrity  
 
(when it did) largely because James Wilson and other  
 
imaginative associates shared the bench. Again, when  
 
measured against modern standards, such charges seem  
 
plausible. Jay produced no scholarship more extensive than  
 
grand jury charges and brief Federalist essays. His  
 
apprenticeship and private practice were relatively  
 
insubstantial, and his judicial experience in New York  
 
before 1789 was fleeting.”28 She concluded that scholars may  
 
rightly decide that Jay “was a poor excuse for an appellate  
 
judge.”29 “Gustavus Myers in his History of the Supreme  
 
Court in the United States (1911), found Jay to be a key  
 
figure in a land-owning combine of colonial aristocrats who  
 
protected the interests of their own class against the  
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popular rank and file.”30  
 
 Jay “was scarcely disposed to take a narrow or  
 
circumscribed view of the judicial power of the Federal  
 
Government, or an enlarged view of the sovereign claims and  
 
immunities of the States. With Jay, no less than with  
 
Wilson, his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia simply marked  
 
the culmination of, and the opportunity to give public,  
 
judicial, and authoritative expression to, views which had  
 
matured during years of public service and of private  
 
thought on the nature of the Union, and of government and  
 
sovereignty in America.”31 In Federalist No. 3 he said:  
 
“When once a national government is established, the best  
 
men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also  
 
will generally be appointed to manage it. ... Hence it will  
 
result that the administration, the political counsels, and  
 
the judicial decisions of the national government will be  
 
more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of the  
 
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with  
 
respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect  
 
to us.”32 Jay’s profoundly nationalist views explain the  
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judicial activism he exhibited in Chisholm.  
 
THE BLAIR OPINION 
 
 John Blair was born in November 1732 to a wealthy and  
 
politically important family. He graduated from the College  
 
of William and Mary in 1754 and studied law in the Middle  
 
Temple in London. He was a Judge of Virginia’s General  
 
Court, High Court of Chancery, and Court of Appeals. He was  
 
a Virginia delegate to the Constitutional Convention along  
 
with George Washington, Edmund Randolph, James Madison,  
 
George Mason, George Wythe, and James McClurg. Madison  
 
recorded him as making no speeches during the Convention.  
 
He was an original appointee to the United States Supreme  
 
Court in 1789. In his Chisholm opinion he said he would  
 
consider the wording of the Constitution and nothing else.  
 
As the Constitution said nothing about sovereign immunity,  
 
this was not a proper way to reach a correct decision.  
 
Noting that Article III, Section 2 conferred the federal  
 
Courts jurisdiction over states, he reasoned in his brief  
 
opinion that once a state “has agreed to be amenable to the  
 
judicial power of the United States, she has, in that  
 
respect, given up her right of sovereignty.”33 No mention  
 
was made of popular sovereignty.  
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Earl Gregg Swem said of Blair: “John Blair ... while  
 
not a man of the first order of ability, was a safe and  
 
conscientious judge. He acted an important part in the  
 
history of the country both before and after the American  
 
revolution.”34 Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire  
 
remarked on Blair’s retirement in 1795: “I consider him as  
 
a man of good abilities, not indeed a Jay, but far superior  
 
to Cushing, a man of firmness, strict integrity and of  
 
great candour.”35 Wythe Holt remarked about Blair: “Though  
 
not a strong thinker as a jurist, John Blair did have an  
 
ability to get to the heart of the matter, was an able and  
 
competent judge, and was, first and foremost, sturdily  
 
devoted to his own interests and to the cause of mercantile  
 
and planter republican independence, as later embodied in  
 
the Federalist Party.”36 It would seem that perhaps Blair  
 
went along with the majority in ruling against Georgia in  
 
order to be a good Federalist. 
 
THE CUSHING OPINION 
 
 William Cushing was born March 1, 1732 in Scituate,  
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Massachusetts. He was the son and grandson of justices of  
 
the Royal superior Court of Judicature of Massachusetts. He  
 
received an A.B. degree from Harvard in 1751, an M.A. from  
 
Yale in 1753 and an M.A. degree from Harvard in 1754. He  
 
was admitted to the Bar in 1755 and practiced law  
 
thereafter. He served as Chief Justice of the Supreme  
 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and was appointed as one of  
 
the original justices of the United States Supreme Court in  
 
1789.  
 
 Cushing reasoned that Article III, Section 2 of the  
 
Constitution was supposed to provide a necessary dispute  
 
resolution method for disputes between states and citizens  
 
of other states. He asserted “As controversies between  
 
State and State, and between a state and citizens of  
 
another State, might tend gradually to involve States in  
 
war and bloodshed, a disinterested civil tribunal was  
 
intended to be instituted to decide such controversies and  
 
preserve peace and friendship. Further, if a State is  
 
entitled to justice in a Federal court against a citizen of  
 
another State, why not such citizens against the State,  
 
when the same language equally comprehends both? The rights  
 
of individuals and the justice due to them are as dear and  
 
precious as those of States. Indeed the latter are founded  
 
upon the former, and the great end and object of them must  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or else  
 
vain is government.”37 Cushing relied on the same  
 
nonexistent law of judicial symmetry as Jay. He said, “no  
 
argument of force can be taken from the sovereignty of  
 
states.” He made no argument based on popular sovereignty.  
 
Apparently anticipating some difficulty with the decision  
 
of the case, he commented that, “If the Constitution is  
 
found inconvenient in this or any other particular, it is  
 
well that a regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”38 He  
 
apparently expected some discontent and controversy about  
 
the Court’s decision. 
 
Cushing’s biographer, John D.Cushing, concluded that:  
 
“As a federal jurist, he did little to distinguish himself.  
 
That he brought long and valuable experience to the new  
 
judiciary is incontestable, but that he played a  
 
significant role in shaping the constitution or legal  
 
customs of the nation is doubtful.”39  
 
THE WILSON OPINION 
 
 James Wilson was born into humble circumstances  
 
September 14, 1742 in Carskerdo, Fifeshire, Scotland. He  
 
attended St. Andrews University and then immigrated to  
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America in 1765 settling in Pennsylvania. He read law under  
 
John Dickinson and began practicing law at Reading,  
 
Pennsylvania in 1767. He was a delegate to the  
 
Constitutional Convention and a Signer of both the  
 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In 1789  
 
President Washington appointed him one of the original  
 
justices of the United States Supreme Court. As a delegate  
 
to the Constitutional Convention he was a nationalist. In a  
 
debate at the Convention, according to James Madison’s  
 
Notes, John Dickinson said that “[t]he preservation of the  
 
States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It  
 
will produce that collision between the different  
 
authorities which should be wished for in order to check  
 
each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether,  
 
would be ruinous. He compared the proposed National System  
 
to the Solar System, in which the States were the planets,  
 
and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits.  
 
The Gentleman from Pa. [Mr. Wilson] wished he said to  
 
extinguish these planets.”40 Early in the Convention Wilson  
 
proposed the establishment of election districts for the  
 
Senate that crossed state lines.41 He argued in the  
 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention that the states were not  
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sovereign and asserted that “in this country the supreme,  
 
absolute, and uncontrollable power resides in the people at  
 
large.”42 He considered the people of the United States to  
 
be the group in which sovereignty resided and not the  
 
separate peoples organized as states.43 “Wilson believed the  
 
United States was one people and not a collection of  
 
divergent interests. He believed the federal government and  
 
the states had distinct powers and the states were mainly  
 
to control local matters. He felt the main danger in the  
 
system was that the states might encroach on federal  
 
powers.  
 
 In his Chisholm opinion, Wilson was true to his  
 
strongly held earlier beliefs: “As a citizen, I know the  
 
Government of that state [Georgia] to be republican; and my  
 
short definition of such a Government is, one constructed  
 
on this principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the  
 
body of the people. As a Judge of this Court, I know, and  
 
can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens of  
 
Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union,  
 
as a part of the ‘People of the United States,’ did not  
 
surrender the Supreme or Sovereign Power to that State;  
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but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to  
 
themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore,  
 
Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.”44 Wilson’s definition of  
 
a republican government differs somewhat from the standard  
 
one. A republican government is “a government of the  
 
people; a government by representatives chosen by the  
 
people.”45 According to Gordon Wood, “By definition it [a  
 
republican government] had no other end than the welfare of  
 
the people: res publica, the public affairs, or the public  
 
good.”46 Wilson argues that a republican government is one  
 
with popular sovereignty rather than one controlled by  
 
representatives elected by the people. 
 
 Wilson, like Jay, believed that sovereignty derived  
 
from feudal principles having no application in the United  
 
States. According to Wilson, “Sovereignty is derived from a  
 
feudal source, and, like many other parts of that system so  
 
degrading to man, still retains its influence over our  
 
sentiments and conduct, though the cause by which that  
 
influence was produced never extended to the American  
 
states.”47 Wilson did admit that sovereign immunity was the  
 
law in England at least since the reign of King Edward I  
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(1272-1307).48  
 
 Wilson thought the rights of states were inferior to  
 
the rights of people: “Man, fearfully and wonderfully made,  
 
is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. A state,  
 
useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior  
 
contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all  
 
its acquired importance.”49 This can only be charitably  
 
characterized as a religious view and is in no sense legal  
 
reasoning or an interpretation of the meaning of the United  
 
States Constitution. 
 
 At the beginning of his opinion, Wilson stated that  
 
the Chisholm case was one of “uncommon magnitude. One of  
 
the parties to it is a State; certainly respectable,  
 
claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined is,  
 
whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars  
 
so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme  
 
Court of the United States? This question, important in  
 
itself, will depend on others, more important still; and,  
 
may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less  
 
radical than this 'do the people of the United States form  
 
a Nation?'”50 He answers his question about the United  
 
States forming a Nation as follows: “Whoever considers, in  
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a combined and comprehensive view, the general texture of  
 
the Constitution, will be satisfied, that the people of the  
 
United States intended to form themselves into a nation for  
 
national purposes. They instituted, for such purposes, a 
 
national Government, complete in all its parts, with powers  
 
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary; and, in all those  
 
powers, extending over the whole nation. Is it congruous,  
 
that, with regard to such purposes, any man or body of men,  
 
any person natural or artificial, should be permitted to  
 
claim successfully an entire exemption from the  
 
jurisdiction of the national Government? Would not such  
 
claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very  
 
existence as a nation?”51 
 
Colonel William R. Davie, a member of the  
 
Constitutional Convention and later a Governor of North  
 
Carolina, wrote James Iredell on June 12, 1793 stating his  
 
views concerning Justice Wilson’s opinion in Chisholm: “I  
 
confess I read some of these arguments and particularly  
 
that by Mr. Wilson with astonishment: however, the scope  
 
and propriety of this elaborate production called an  
 
argument, were expressly reserved for the contemplation of  
 
‘a few, a very few comprehensive minds;’ and, perhaps,  
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notwithstanding the tawdry ornament and poetical imagery  
 
with which it is loaded and bedizened, it may still be very  
 
‘profound.’ On this I shall give no opinion; but as a law  
 
argument it certainly has the merit of being truly  
 
‘original.’ His definition of the American States as  
 
sovereignties is more like an epic poem than a Judge’s  
 
argument, and we look in vain for legal principles or  
 
logical conclusions. The illustration he has drawn from the  
 
relation of the word subject to the word sovereign, as  
 
contradistinguished from the appellation of citizen as the  
 
correlative of the American Government, is no better than a  
 
contemptible play upon words, like his ‘collection of  
 
original sovereigns:’ indeed, speaking professionally, or  
 
as he says ‘politically and classically,’ this whole  
 
argument of his seems to be the rhapsody of some visionary  
 
theorist and entirely unworthy of my former idea of that  
 
man.”52 Prof. Clyde E. Jacobs of the University of  
 
California, Davis opined that “because Wilson seized upon  
 
Chisholm v. Georgia as a medium for expounding a strongly  
 
nationalist constitutional philosophy, his opinion is  
 
rather weak in certain technical particulars. Moreover, as  
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a state paper, it was at least impolitic; many contemporary  
 
statesmen and politicians read it as an exercise in  
 
judicial usurpation, which called for repudiation.”53 
 
 Jean-Marc Pascal, in his study of Wilson’s ideas,  
 
concluded that “Wilson was not an original thinker”  
 
although he was “an outstanding exponent of the American  
 
system of government and an exemplary spokesman of the  
 
American Enlightenment.”54 
 
THE IREDELL DISSENTING OPINION 
 James Iredell was born in Lewes, England October 5,  
1751, the oldest of five children of a Bristol merchant. At  
the age of 17, he emigrated from England to North Carolina  
where he entered the customs service at Edenton. He read  
law under Samuel Johnston, later a governor of North  
Carolina, and was admitted to the bar in 1770. After the  
outbreak of the American Revolution he helped to organize  
the North Carolina court system. In 1777, he became a judge  
and in 1779 attorney general of North Carolina. His strong  
support of the proposed U.S. Constitution helped procure  
its adoption by North Carolina. North Carolina was the next  
to last of the original thirteen states to ratify the  
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Constitution and ratification was accomplished there with  
some difficulty. President George Washington nominated  
Iredell to the Supreme Court in early 1790, and the Senate  
confirmed him two days later.  
 Judge Iredell observed, in accordance with Section 13  
 
of the judiciary Act of 1789, that the Supreme Court had  
 
concurrent jurisdiction of cases such as Chisholm with the  
 
appropriate state court.55 Section 34 of the Judiciary Act,  
 
the so-called Rules of Decision Act, provided, “That the  
 
laws of the several states, except where the constitution,  
 
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise  
 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision  
 
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States  
 
in cases where they apply.”56 This meant the Chisholm case  
 
had to be decided using state law. Georgia followed the  
 
rule of sovereign immunity. Justice Iredell thus found no  
 
law in support of a cause of an action by a citizen of  
 
South Carolina against the state of Georgia for debt in  
 
federal court: 
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[I]t is observable that in instances like this before 
the Court, this Court hath a concurrent jurisdiction 
only; the present being one of those cases where by 
the judicial act this Court hath original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction. This Court, therefore, under 
that act, can exercise no authority in such instances, 
but such authority as from the subject matter of it 
may be exercised in some other Court. There are no 
Courts with which such a concurrence can be suggested 
but the Circuit Courts, or Courts of the different 
States. With the former it cannot be, for admitting 
that the Constitution is not to have a restrictive 
operation, so as to confine all cases in which a State 
is a party exclusively to the Supreme Court (an 
opinion to which I am strongly inclined), yet there 
are no words in the definition of the powers of the 
Circuit Court which give a colour to an opinion, 
that where a suit is brought against a State by a 
citizen of another State, the Circuit Court could 
exercise any jurisdiction at all. If they could, 
however, such a jurisdiction, by the very terms of 
their authority, could be only concurrent with the 
Courts of the several States. It follows, therefore, 
unquestionably, I think, that looking at the act of 
Congress, which I consider is on this occasion the 
limit of our authority (whatever further might be 
constitutionaly, enacted) we can exercise no authority 
in the present instance consistently with the clear 
intention of the act, but such as a proper State Court 
would have been at least competent to exercise at the 
time the act was passed. 
 
If therefore, no new remedy be provided (as plainly is 
the case), and consequently we have no other rule to 
govern us but the principles of the pre-existent laws, 
which must remain in force till superceded by others, 
then it is incumbent upon us to enquire, whether 
previous to the adoption of the Constitution (which 
period, or the period of passing the law, in respect 
to the object of this enquiry, is perfectly equal) an 
action of the nature like this before the Court could 
have been maintained against one of the States in the 
Union upon the principles of the common law, which I 
have shown to be alone applicable. If it could, I 
think it is now maintainable here; If it could not, I 
think, as the law stands at present, it is not 
maintainable; whatever opinion may be entertained; 
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upon the construction of the Constitution, as to the 
power of Congress to authorize such a one. Now I 
presume it will not be denied, that in every State in 
the Union, previous to the adoption of the 
Constitution, the only common law principles in 
regard to suits that were in any manner admissible in 
respect to claims against the State, were those which 
in England apply to claims against the crown; there 
being certainly no other principles of the common law 
which, previous to the adoption of this Constitution 
could, in any manner, or upon any colour apply to the 
case of a claim against a State in its own Courts, 
where it was solely and completely sovereign in 
respect to such cases at least. Whether that remedy 
was strictly applicable or not, still I apprehend 
there was no other. … It is stated, indeed, in Com. 
Dig. 105. That 'until the time of Edward I. the King 
might have been sued in all actions as a common 
person.' And some authorities are cited for that 
position, though it is even there stated as a doubt.57 
 
Like Justice Wilson, Justice Iredell found sovereign  
 
immunity of the English crown to have been uniformly the  
 
law at least since the reign of King Edward I (1272-1307).  
 
There being no law authorizing citizens to sue states  
 
for debt, Justice Iredell, was of the opinion that  
 
dismissal of the case was required. He analyzed the nature  
 
of the states in our federal system as follows: 
 
A State does not owe its origin to the Government of 
the United States, in the highest or in any of its 
branches. It was in existence before it. It derives 
its authority from the same pure and sacred source as 
itself: The voluntary and deliberate choice of the 
people. ... A State is altogether exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, or 
from any other exterior authority, unless, in the 
special instances where the general Government has 
power derived from the Constitution itself. ... A 
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State, though subject in certain specified particulars 
to the authority of the Government of the United 
States, is in every other respect totally independent 
upon it. The people of the State created, the people 
of the State can only change, its Constitution. Upon 
this power there is no other limitation but that 
imposed by the Constitution of the United States; that 
it must be of the Republican form.58 
 
 He summarizes the conclusions of his opinion as  
 
follows: 
 
I have now, I think, established the following 
particulars. 1st. That the Constitution, so far as it 
respects the judicial authority, can only be carried 
into effect by acts of the Legislature appointing 
Courts, and prescribing their methods of proceeding. 
2nd. That Congress has provided no new law in regard 
to this case, but expressly referred us to the old. 
3rd. That there are no principles of the old law, to 
which, we must have recourse, that in any manner 
authorise the present suit, either by precedent or by 
analogy. The consequence of which, in my opinion, 
clearly is, that the suit in question cannot be 
maintained.59 
 
He adds in dicta (a view not required in deciding the  
 
case): 
 
So much, however, has been said on the Constitution, 
that it may not be improper to intimate that my 
present opinion is strongly against any construction 
of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a 
compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of 
money. I think every word in the Constitution may have 
its full effect without involving this consequence, 
and that nothing but express words, or an 
insurmountable implication (neither of which I 
consider, can be found in this case) would authorize 
the deduction of so high a power.60 
 
Judge Iredell thus came down on the side of the states 
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having sovereign immunity rather than all sovereignty being  
 
only in the people. He did not use the fictitious popular  
 
sovereignty argument. While the opinion of Justice Iredell  
 
may seem like just another dissenting opinion without legal  
 
force, it is very important. The holding in Chisholm v.  
 
Georgia was reversed by the Eleventh Amendment to the  
 
United States Constitution. This development made Justice  
 
Iredell’s opinion that of the Court although not in a  
 
strict legal sense. Ordinarily, when a higher court  
 
reverses a case there is a written opinion detailing the  
 
manner in which the lower court was wrong. As Chisholm was  
 
reversed by constitutional amendment, there is no document  
 
revealing just how the court went wrong. This has led to  
 
problems of understanding and interpretation that persist  
 
to this day. In particular, there is an argument about  
 
whether Chisholm was reversed by the Eleventh Amendment  
 
because it was an incorrect interpretation of the  
 
Constitution or whether Chisholm was correct but the people  
 
didn’t want such cases in the federal courts. The speed and  
 
near unanimity with which the Eleventh Amendment was  
 
adopted make it “plain that just about everybody in  
 
Congress agreed the Supreme Court had misread the  
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Constitution.”61 Justice Joseph P. Bradley in his opinion of  
 
the court in the very important case of Hans v. Louisiana,  
 
134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 832 (1890) made  
 
significant use of Judge Iredell’s arguments. Hans  
 
concerned the issue of federal question jurisdiction in  
 
suits against states. 
 
REACTION TO CHISHOLM IN THE NEWSPAPERS 
 
Writing of the Chisholm decision, American lawyer and  
 
historian, Charles Warren, concludes that “Both the Bar and  
 
the public in general appeared entirely unprepared for the  
 
doctrine upheld by the Court; and their surprise was  
 
warranted, when they recalled that the vesting of any such  
 
jurisdiction over sovereign States had been expressly  
 
disclaimed and even resented by the great defenders of the  
 
Constitution, during the days of the contest over its  
 
adoption.”62 
 
The clause in the Constitution providing for original  
 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of cases between states  
 
and citizens of other States as well as between states and  
 
foreign states, citizens, or subjects could possibly be  
 
referred to as the “Trojan horse clause” as it was  
 
definitively construed by leading Federalists before  
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ratification not to provide a forum for suits in federal  
 
court against States by citizens of other States and then  
 
after ratification received, in Chisholm, the opposite  
 
interpretation. There was some sentiment that the  
 
Federalists planned this strategy in advance as a way of  
 
abolishing the sovereignty of the States which had not been  
 
possible in the Convention. An unnamed “correspondent” to  
 
the Independent Chronicle, a Boston newspaper, wrote “[the]  
 
novelty of an independent and sovereign state being obliged  
 
to respond in a Court of Justice, consisting, perhaps, of  
 
its own citizens, is not less striking, than the importance  
 
of the consequences which may result from an acquiescence  
 
in this stride of authority. ... When the persons in  
 
opposition to the acceptance of the new Constitution hinged  
 
on the article respecting the Judiciary Department being so  
 
very extensive and alarming as to comprehend even the State  
 
itself, as a party to an action for debt; this was denied  
 
peremptorily by the Federalists, as an absurdity in terms.  
 
But it is now said, that the eloquent and profound  
 
reasoning of the Chief Justice has made that to be right,  
 
which was at first doubtful or improper.”63  
 
On July 9, 1793, Governor John Hancock issued a  
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proclamation calling the Massachusetts legislature, the  
 
General Court, into Special Session to consider the  
 
problems caused by the suit of William Vassal against the  
 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the United States Supreme  
 
Court. On that date Governor Hancock had been served with a  
 
subpoena ordering him to appear before the Supreme Court on  
 
August 5, 1793 to offer a defense to the suit. Governor  
 
Hancock thought the matter was one for the legislature to  
 
consider and make decisions about. Governor Hancock was  
 
seeking a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment  
 
making suits against states by citizens of other states,  
 
foreign states and citizens or subjects thereof, illegal.  
 
According to the Boston Gazette: “The Proclamation of  
 
Governor Hancock, inserted in this Gazette, must excite  
 
serious ideas in those who have from the beginning been  
 
inclined to suspect that the absorption of the State  
 
Governments has long been a matter determined on by certain  
 
influential characters in this country, who are aiming  
 
gradually at monarchy.”64 
 
The Columbian Centinel, a Boston newspaper, had a  
 
Federalist writer who published a series of articles using  
 
the name “Crito.” Crito identified himself as a lawyer. A  
 
person using the name “Anti-Wizard” responded to an article  
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by “Crito” in the Columbian Centinel arguing that the  
 
Federalists were trying to “ram down the throats of  
 
Freemen” a King, Lords, Commons, and a standing army. He  
 
claimed lawyers had used craft and subtlety to introduce  
 
the Trojan horse clause into the Constitution with a view  
 
to reduce the States to corporations.65  
 
In the Salem Gazette of Salem, Massachusetts, a person  
 
writing under the name “Uncle Toby” and also responding to  
 
Crito had a somewhat similar anti-lawyer view. He claimed  
 
the Norman Conquest was not complete until Norman lawyers  
 
introduced laws reducing slavery to a “system.” He warned  
 
readers not to let American lawyers profit from similar  
 
behavior.66  
 
Gordon Wood believes the arguments advanced by the  
 
Federalists were contrived for the purpose of causing the  
 
ratification of the Constitution: “Considering the  
 
Federalist desire for a high-toned government filled with  
 
the better sorts of people, there is something decidedly  
 
disingenuous about the democratic radicalism of their  
 
arguments, their continual emphasis on the popular  
 
character of the Constitution, their manipulation of Whig  
 
maxims, their stressing of the representational nature of  
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all parts of government, including the greatly strengthened   
 
executive and Senate. In effect, they appropriated and  
 
exploited the language that more rightly belonged to their  
 
opponents. The result was a beginning of a hiatus in  
 
American politics between ideology and motives that was  
 
never again closed. By using the most popular and  
 
democratic rhetoric available to explain and justify their  
 
aristocratic system, the Federalists helped to foreclose  
 
the development of an American intellectual tradition in  
 
which differing ideas of politics would be intimately and  
 
genuinely related to differing social interests.”67 
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CHAPTER IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND POST-CHISHOLM 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 New York elected John Jay Governor in May 1795 and 
 
he resigned from the United States Supreme Court to take  
 
that position. President John Adams nominated Jay as Chief  
 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1800 but Jay  
 
declined the nomination due to weak health and the  
 
“fatigues incident to the office.”68 John Blair resigned  
 
from the Supreme Court October 25, 1795 due to failing  
 
health. William Cushing was a candidate for Governor of  
 
Massachusetts in 1794 and 1795 but was soundly defeated  
 
both times by Samuel Adams. His Chisholm opinion was  
 
unpopular in Massachusetts. President Washington nominated  
 
Cushing to be Chief Justice in 1796 after Alexander  
 
Hamilton, John Rutledge, and Patrick Henry had all declined  
 
the position. Cushing was unanimously confirmed by the  
 
Senate but resigned after serving for only a week due to  
 
ill health. He retained his position as Associate Justice  
 
and served until his death September 13, 1810. James Wilson  
 
aspired to be Chief Justice but was passed over many times.  
 
He died of malaria in Edenton, North Carolina on August 21,  
 
1798 in a state of financial embarrassment due to  
 
unsuccessful land speculation. James Iredell served on the  
 
                                                 
45 
 
 
 
 
68 Stahr, 364. 
Court until his death October 20, 1799. Apparently the  
 
opinions of Jay and Cushing in Chisholm did not harm their  
 
standing with the Federalists as they both received  
 
nominations afterwards to be Chief Justice. One can surmise  
 
that their opinions in Chisholm were consistent with  
 
Federalist ideology.  
 
Two days after the Chisholm decision was announced a  
 
resolution of uncertain authorship was introduced in the  
 
Senate proposing a constitutional amendment abolishing  
 
citizen-state diversity jurisdiction worded as follows:  
 
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend  
 
to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted  
 
against one of the United States by citizens of another  
 
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”69  
 
However, the Second Congress adjourned without taking any  
 
action on the matter.  
 
 On November 4, 1793, Georgia Governor Edward Telfair  
 
presented to a joint session of the Georgia legislature his  
 
annual message and referred to the recent Chisholm decision  
 
of the United States Supreme Court as follows: 
 
A process from the Supreme Court of the United States 
at the instance of Chisolm, executor of Farquhar, has 
been served upon me and the attorney-general. I 
declined entering any appearance, as this would have 
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69 Annals of Congress (2d Congress, February 20, 1793), Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office , III, 651-652. 
introduced a precedent replete with danger to the 
Republic, and would have involved this State in 
complicated difficulties, abstracted from the 
infractions which it would have made in her retained 
sovereignty. The singular predicament to which she has 
been reduced by savage inroads has caused an emission 
of paper upwards of £150,000 since the close of the 
late war, a considerable part of which is still 
outstanding, and which in good faith and upon 
constitutional principles is the debt of the United 
States. I say were action admissible under such 
grievous circumstances, an annihilation of her 
political existence must follow. To guard against 
civil discord as well as the impending danger, permit 
me most ardently to request your most serious 
attention to the measure of recommending to the 
legislatures of the several states that they effect a 
remedy in the premises by amendment to the 
Constitution; and that to give further weight to this 
matter, the delegation of this State in Congress be 
requested to urge that body to propose an amendment to 
the several legislatures.70 
 
The Georgia House of Representatives passed a bill  
 
providing the death penalty for any U.S. Marshal attempting  
 
to enforce the Chisholm decision: 
 
That any Federal Marshal, or any other person or 
persons levying or attempting to levy on the territory 
of this state or any part thereof, or on the treasury 
or any other property of the Governor or Attorney 
General, or any of the people thereof, under or by 
virtue of any execution or other compulsory process 
issuing out of, or by authority of the supreme court 
of the United States, as it now stands, be 
constituted; for, or in behalf of the before-mentioned 
Alexander Chisholm, executor of Robert Farquhar, or 
for, or in behalf of any other person or persons 
whatsoever, for the payment or recovery of any debt or 
pretended debt, or claim against the state of Georgia; 
shall be, and or they attempting to levy as aforesaid, 
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are hereby declared to be guilty of felony, and shall 
suffer death, without benefit of the clergy, by being 
hanged.71 
 
This bill did not pass in the Georgia Senate probably due  
 
to favorable prospects for a constitutional amendment  
 
nullifying the Chisholm decision. 
 
 On January 2, 1794 a Senator, now unknown, introduced  
 
a resolution proposing the exact text of the Eleventh  
 
Amendment in the United States Senate reading as follows:  
 
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by citizens of another State, or by citizens of 
subjects of a foreign State.72 
 
This proposed amendment eliminated citizen-state diversity  
 
jurisdiction in cases involving suits against states by  
 
citizens of other states and citizens and subjects of  
 
foreign states as well as prohibiting the Courts from  
 
construing the judicial power of the United States in such  
 
a way as to permit a Chisholm type suit. The wording of the  
 
proposed amendment clearly conveyed a lack of confidence in  
 
the ability and/or willingness of judges to correctly  
 
interpret the Constitution. Such an amendment eliminated  
 
problems like Chisholm in the future but failed to  
 
specifically resolve or clarify the underlying question of  
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state sovereign immunity. This left an unfortunate  
 
ambiguity in constitutional law. 
 
 A two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress  
 
proposed the Eleventh Amendment, which was one of the  
 
methods for proposing an amendment. Ratification of the  
 
proposed Eleventh Amendment required the approval of  
 
the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. By  
 
February 7, 1795 the required number of states had ratified  
 
the Eleventh Amendment.73 However, the Presidential  
 
proclamation of ratification did not occur until January 8,  
 
1798.74 On February 14, 1798 the Supreme Court decided  
 
unanimously that “there could not be exercised any  
 
jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state  
 
was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens  
 
or subjects of any foreign state,” Hollingsworth v.  
 
Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 1 L.Ed. 644, 3 Dallas 378 (1798).75  
 
While the language of the Eleventh Amendment seems at  
 
first blush to be simple and clear enough, the amendment  
 
has been subjected to many different and contradictory  
 
interpretations by commentators and the Courts.  
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No further reported cases against states invoking the  
 
sovereign immunity defense appeared in the Supreme Court  
 
until 1890 when a very important case involving Louisiana  
 
bonds came before it. 
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CHAPTER V. HANS V. LOUISIANA AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
 
 In 1890, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of  
 
state sovereign immunity. Bernard Hans, a citizen of  
 
Louisiana, sued the state to pay the coupons on some  
 
defaulted state bonds he was holding. He also alleged that  
 
Louisiana had violated the Constitution by impairing the  
 
obligation of a contract. This created a federal issue.76  
 
The Eleventh Amendment did not apply in this case as there  
 
was no citizen-state diversity jurisdiction. The Circuit  
 
Court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction, Hans  
 
v. State of Louisiana, 24 F. 55 (E.D., Louisiana, 1885).  
 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in Hans v.  
 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 832 (1890),  
 
decided Louisiana had no liability due to sovereign  
 
immunity. Justice Bradley, writing the opinion of the  
 
Court said: 
 
The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions 
unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not 
contemplated by the constitution when establishing the 
judicial power of the United States. Some things, 
undoubtedly, were made justiciable which were not 
known as such at the common law; such, for example,   
as controversies between states as to boundary lines, 
and other questions admitting of judicial solution. 
... The suability of a state, without its consent, was 
a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often 
laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that 
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it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted. It was 
fully shown by an exhaustive examination of the old 
law by Mr. Justice Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm 
v. Georgia; and it has been conceded in every case 
since, where the question has, in any way, been 
presented. ...    
But besides the presumption that no anomalous and 
unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to be 
raised up by the Constitution -- anomalous and unheard 
of when the Constitution was adopted – an additional 
reason why the jurisdiction claimed for the Circuit 
Court does not exist, is the language of the act of 
Congress by which its jurisdiction is conferred. The 
words are these: "The circuit courts of the United 
States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with 
the courts of the several States, of all suits of a 
civil nature at common law or in equity, . . . arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
or treaties," etc. -- "Concurrent with the courts of 
the several States." Does not this qualification show 
that Congress, in legislating to carry the 
Constitution into effect, did not intend to invest its 
courts with any new and strange jurisdictions? The 
state courts have no power to entertain suits by 
individuals against a State without its consent. Then 
how does the Circuit Court, having only concurrent 
jurisdiction, acquire any such power? It is true that 
the same qualification existed in the judiciary act of 
1789, which was before the court in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, and the majority of the court did not think 
that it was sufficient to limit the jurisdiction of 
the Circuit Court. Justice Iredell thought 
differently. In view of the manner in which that 
decision was received by the country, the adoption of 
the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and the 
reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to 
prefer Justice Iredell's views in this regard.77 
 
 Justice Bradley’s opinion was very similar to that of  
 
Justice Iredell in Chisholm. He observed that a cause of  
 
action by an individual against a state for debt was  
 
unknown before Chisholm. The state and federal courts  
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exercised concurrent jurisdiction over such actions which  
 
meant that the law would be the same in both courts. No  
 
state allowed such suits. As pointed out by Justice  
 
Bradley, the Eleventh Amendment “expressing the will of the  
 
ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all  
 
legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision  
 
of the supreme court [in Chisholm].”78 Justice Bradley was  
 
rated in The First One Hundred Justices as one of the “near  
 
great” justices of the Supreme Court.79 
 
 The Hans case has encountered much criticism due to  
 
its use in barring federal question suits against states.  
 
Although the Eleventh Amendment had no application in Hans,  
 
the case law later interpreted it as an Eleventh Amendment  
 
case. In fact, Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag, asserts that  
 
Hans is “the seminal Eleventh Amendment case, the case from  
 
which all significant Eleventh Amendment doctrine now  
 
flows, and to which both supporters and critics of Eleventh  
 
Amendment jurisprudence look to begin their discussion.”80 
 
One recent book criticizing Hans is Narrowing the  
 
Nation’s Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States by  
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John T. Noonan, Jr. The author is a former law professor  
 
and judge of the United States Court of Appeals. He has his  
 
character Clio say: “As a matter of fact, there is a  
 
constitution that Joseph Bradley and his companions in Hans  
 
might have been expounding. It’s called the Constitution of  
 
the Confederate States of America, adopted March 11,  
 
1861.”81 More seriously, Noonan argues that sovereign  
 
immunity is a common law doctrine that Marshall, Madison,  
 
and Hamilton probably believed to be in force. He argues  
 
that Chief Justice John Marshall held that the states  
 
waived sovereign immunity as to federal questions  
 
when they ratified the constitution, citing as his  
 
authority Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia,  
 
19 U.S. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). Cohens was  
 
an appeal of Virginia criminal convictions to the United  
 
States Supreme Court. The brothers Cohen were convicted of  
 
unlawfully selling lottery tickets for the National Lottery  
 
in the state of Virginia. It was argued without success  
 
that appellate jurisdiction in such a case was barred by  
 
the Eleventh Amendment or was otherwise outside the  
 
judicial power of the United States. The Eleventh Amendment  
 
refers to “any suit in law or equity, commenced or  
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prosecuted against one of the United States.” An appeal is  
 
the continuation of an already existing case and not a new  
 
suit being commenced or prosecuted. Justice Marshall ruled  
 
that the appeal in Cohens was not a suit in law or equity  
 
commenced or prosecuted against Virginia within the meaning  
 
of the Eleventh Amendment. He compared the case to appeals  
 
against the United States: “The point of view in which this  
 
writ of error, with its citation, has been considered  
 
uniformly in the Courts of the Union, has been well  
 
illustrated by a reference to the course of this Court in  
 
suits instituted by the United States. The universally  
 
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or  
 
prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary  
 
act does not authorize such suits. Yet writs of error,  
 
accompanied with citations, have uniformly issued for the  
 
removal of judgments in favour of the United States into a  
 
superior Court, where they have, like those in favour of an  
 
individual, been re-examined, and affirmed or reversed. It  
 
has never been suggested, that such writ of error was a  
 
suit against the United States, and, therefore, not within  
 
the jurisdiction of the appellate Court.”82 The Cohens  
 
appeal was not a suit against Virginia to which the  
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Eleventh Amendment might have some arguable application.  
 
The constitutional basis for the Cohens appeal was not  
 
original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2 of  
 
the Constitution but Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.83  
 
Justice Marshall made no ruling in Cohens that  
 
the states waived objection to federal question  
 
jurisdiction by ratifying the Constitution or joining the  
 
Union. 
 
Likewise, Alexander Hamilton never opined that the  
 
states waived objection to federal question jurisdiction by  
 
ratifying the constitution. Noonan refers to Federalist No.  
 
80 where Hamilton writes about restrictions on state power  
 
in the constitution such as imposing duties on imported  
 
articles and emission of paper money. He states that some  
 
enforcement power is implied and that this “power must  
 
either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an  
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authority in the federal courts to overrule such as might  
 
be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. ...  
 
The latter appears to have been thought by the convention  
 
preferable to the former.”84 Hamilton made his opinion about  
 
sovereign immunity clear in Federalist No. 81: “It is  
 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to  
 
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the  
 
general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the  
 
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now  
 
enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union.  
 
Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in  
 
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the  
 
states.”85 The general remarks of Federalist 80 are  
 
sharpened by the more specific remarks in Federalist 81 and  
 
make clear Hamilton’s unambiguous opinion.  
  
 Noonan admits that James Madison never made an  
 
argument that the states waived objection to federal  
 
question jurisdiction. His argument that Hans was wrongly  
 
decided will not hold water. 
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CHAPTER VI. POST-HANS CASES INVOLVING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AND ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
 In 1900, the Supreme Court decided another case  
 
involving the issue of sovereign immunity. In this case, a  
 
corporation chartered by an Act of Congress sued the  
 
Treasurer of California in his official capacity. 
 
SMITH V. REEVES 
 
 In Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44  
 
L.Ed. 1140 (1900), the Receivers of the Atlantic and  
 
Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation created by an 1866  
 
Act of Congress, brought suit against the Treasurer of  
 
California in his official capacity for a recovery of taxes  
 
paid. The Court regarded this suit as one against the state  
 
of California. Such a suit did not fall within the ambit  
 
of the Eleventh Amendment as the railroad company was not a  
 
citizen of a state or a citizen or subject of a foreign  
 
state. Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing for a  
 
unanimous Court, declared that, “[t]he present plaintiffs,  
 
as did the plaintiffs in Hans v. Louisiana, base the  
 
argument in support of their right to sue the State in the  
 
Circuit Court upon the mere letter of the Constitution. We  
 
deem it unnecessary to repeat or enlarge upon the reasons  
 
given in Hans v. Louisiana why a suit brought against a  
 
State by one of its citizens was excluded from the judicial  
58 
 
 
 
 
 
power of the United States, even it is one arising under  
 
the Constitution and Laws of the United States. They apply  
 
equally to a suit of that character brought against the  
 
State by a corporation created by Congress.”86 The case was  
 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Justice Harlan had  
 
written a concurring opinion in Hans stating that Chisholm,  
 
in his view, was decided correctly in 1793 based on the law  
 
in effect at that time. Justice Harlan was one of the  
 
twelve justices receiving a rating of “great” in The First  
 
One Hundred Justices.87 
 
 The Supreme Court also ruled that sovereign immunity  
 
applied to suits in admiralty against states whether in  
 
personum or in rem. In 1921 two such suits came before the  
 
Court for decision.  
 
EX PARTE NEW YORK, NO. 1 
 The case of Ex Parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490; 41  
S.Ct. 588; 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) was an admiralty suit  
against the state of New York. An admiralty case is a case,  
civil or criminal, resulting from maritime contracts,  
torts, injuries, and offenses done upon or relating to the  
sea, navigable streams running into the sea, and the Great  
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Lakes. The Eleventh Amendment did not apply as it only  
applies to suits “in law and equity.” This case involved  
damages to vessels on the Erie canal caused by tugboats  
and sought in personum relief. In personum relief is money  
damages. Justice Mahlon Pitney delivered the opinion for a  
unanimous Court saying, “That a state may not be sued  
without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence  
having so important a bearing upon the construction of the  
Constitution of the United States that it has become  
established by repeated decisions of this court that the  
entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not  
embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private  
parties against a state without consent given.”88  
EX PARTE NEW YORK, NO. 2 
The case of Ex Parte New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503; 41  
S.Ct. 592; 65 L.Ed. 1063 (1921) was an action against the  
 
steam tug Queen City involving a drowning on the Erie canal  
 
allegedly caused by the negligent operation of the tug. The  
 
suit sought in rem relief. That is, the suit sought the  
 
seizure and sale of the Queen City. An in rem suit is one  
 
against property in contradistinction to personal actions  
 
for money damages. The Queen City was the property of the  
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state of New York. Justice Pitney ruled in favor of New  
 
York noting that permitting a creditor to seize and sell  
 
government property “to collect his debt would be to 
 
permit him in some degree to destroy the government  
 
itself."89 The Court ruled the Queen City exempt from  
 
seizure by admiralty process in rem due to its ownership by  
 
the state of New York. 
 
 In 1934 a suit was brought against Mississippi by the  
 
Principality of Monaco on some old defaulted state bonds.  
 
The Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit this suit.   
 
MONACO v. MISSISSIPPI 
 
Another unsuccessful attempt was made to pierce the  
 
sovereign immunity of the states in the case of Monaco v.  
 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313; 54 S.Ct. 745; 78 L.Ed. 1282  
 
(1934). Several holders of seventy year old unpaid  
 
Mississippi bonds donated them to the Principality of  
 
Monaco, which was to use them for charitable purposes.  
 
Monaco then attempted to sue Mississippi to force payment  
 
on the bonds in the Supreme Court of the United States  
 
pursuant to the clause in Section 2 of Article III of the  
 
Constitution providing for jurisdiction in the case of  
 
suits “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and  
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foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”. The Eleventh  
 
Amendment did not apply in this case as Monaco was a  
 
foreign state rather than a citizen or subject of a foreign  
 
state. A unanimous Court in an opinion by Chief Justice  
 
Charles Evans Hughes ruled that an action such as that of  
 
Monaco was impossible without the consent of the parties  
 
and denied leave to file the suit. Chief Justice Hughes was  
 
one of the twelve justices rated as “great” in The First  
 
One Hundred Justices.90  
 
 This case was somewhat like Chisholm in that there was  
 
a jurisdictional statute permitting the suit, but no  
 
justiciable cause of action. Chief Justice Hughes ruled  
 
that “States of the Union, still possessing attributes of  
 
sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their  
 
consent, save where there has been ‘a surrender of this 
 
immunity in the plan of the convention.’ The Federalist,  
 
No. 81.”91 This language of Chief Justice Hughes occurs in 
 
later cases about sovereign immunity. In considering the  
 
plan of the convention, the Court cited remarks of James  
 
Madison in the Virginia Ratifying Convention in which he  
 
stated: “The next case provides for disputes between a  
 
foreign state and one of our states, should such a case  
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ever arise; and between a citizen and a foreign citizen or  
 
subject. I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be  
 
decided, in these courts, between an American state and a  
 
foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they  
 
consent, provision is here made.”92 John Marshall expressed  
 
similar views in the Virginia Ratifying Convention.93  
 
 Another issue concerning the Eleventh Amendment was  
 
whether Congress had authority to abrogate the Eleventh  
 
Amendment immunity of the states by statute. At first it  
 
was thought by many that Congress could do this. The first  
 
successful abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity  
 
was against the state of Alabama.  
 
PARDEN V. TERMINAL RAILWAY OF ALABAMA 
 
 Citizens of Alabama sued a railway owned by Alabama in  
 
the United States District Court to recover damages under  
 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for injuries sustained  
 
while working for the railway. The federal statute  
 
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of Alabama. At  
 
issue was whether this statute was constitutional. The  
 
Supreme Court ruled it was in a five to four decision in an  
 
opinion by Justice William Joseph Brennan, Jr. joined by  
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Justices Warren, Black, Clark, and Goldberg. Justice White  
 
dissented joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart.  
 
Justice Brennan was the leader of the liberals on the Court  
 
during his tenure from 1956 until 1990. He stated:  
 
“Recognition of the congressional power to render a state  
 
suable under the FELA does not mean the immunity doctrine,  
 
as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment with respect to  
 
citizens of other States and as extended to the State’s own  
 
citizens by the Hans case, is here being overridden. It  
 
remains the law that a state may not be sued by an  
 
individual without its consent. Our conclusion is simply  
 
that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate  
 
railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the  
 
FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as is authorized  
 
by that Act.”94 The dissent argued that abrogation was a  
 
matter for the Congress instead of the Court. If Congress  
 
decided to condition privileges within its control on the  
 
forfeiture of constitutional rights “its intention to do so  
 
should appear with unmistakable clarity.”95 
 
 The rationale of the Parden dissenters came to be the  
 
majority view in our next case.96  
                                                 
94 Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 
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EMPLOYEES OF DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE OF MISSOURI 
V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
 
 This was a suit by employees of Missouri state  
 
agencies to recover overtime compensation due under the  
 
Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion  
 
of the Court joined by Justices Burger, White, Blackmun,  
 
Powell and Rehnquist. He ruled that Missouri could not be  
 
sued under the FELA unless Congress indicated “in some way 
 
by clear language that the constitutional immunity was  
 
swept away.”97 The Court dismissed the case.  
 
Justice Marshall concurred in a separate opinion  
 
joined by Justice Stewart. He opined that “common law”  
 
sovereign immunity was not a bar and the FLSA did  
 
effectively lift the state’s immunity from private suit. He  
 
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as barring the suit: “On  
 
its face the Amendment, of course, makes no mention of a  
 
citizen's attempt to sue his own State in federal court,  
 
the situation with which we deal here. Nevertheless, I  
 
believe it clear that the judicial power of the United  
 
States does not extend to suits such as this, absent  
 
consent by the State to the exercise of such power.”98 
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Justice Marshall suggested that the employees might seek  
 
relief in the state courts of Missouri: “This is not to  
 
say, however, that petitioners are without a forum in which  
 
personally to seek redress against the State. n12 Section  
 
16 (b)'s authorization for employee suits to be brought ‘in  
 
any court of competent jurisdiction’ includes state as well  
 
as federal courts. ... [S]ince federal law stands as the  
 
supreme law of the land, the State's courts are obliged to  
 
enforce it, even if it conflicts with state policy.”99 
 
 Justice Brennan dissented. He viewed the Eleventh  
 
Amendment differently from the other members of the Court.  
 
He said any “statement that we may infer from the Eleventh  
 
Amendment a ‘constitutional immunity,’ ante, at 285,  
 
protecting States from § 16 (b) suits brought in federal  
 
court by its own citizens, must be rejected. I emphatically  
 
question, as I develop later, that sovereign immunity is a 
 
constitutional limitation upon the federal judicial power  
 
to entertain suits against States. Indeed, despite some  
 
assumptions in opinions of this Court, I know of no  
 
concrete evidence that the framers of the Amendment  
 
thought, let alone intended, that even the Amendment would  
 
ensconce the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On its face,  
 
the Amendment says nothing about sovereign immunity but  
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enacts an express limitation upon federal judicial power.”  
 
His view was that Congress validly exercised its authority  
 
under the Commerce Clause and a “common-law shield of  
 
sovereign immunity” was no defense.100 He said the trend  
 
since Hans was against enforcement of governmental immunity  
 
“except when clearly required by explicit textual  
 
prohibitions, as in the Eleventh Amendment”101 
 
 In 1985 the validity of the Hans doctrine was  
 
questioned in the Supreme Court for the first time after  
 
being the law in numerous cases for ninety-five years. 
 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
 
 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,  
 
105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed. 2d 171 (1985), a disappointed job  
 
applicant alleging handicap discrimination sued a state  
 
hospital and the California Department of Mental Health in  
 
United States District Court. The District Court dismissed  
 
the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The Court of  
 
Appeals reversed the District Court. The Supreme Court  
 
reversed the Court of Appeals. The majority opinion by  
 
Justice Powell joined by Justices Burger, White, Rehnquist,  
 
and O’Connor held that the suit was proscribed by the  
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Eleventh Amendment as the Rehabilitation Act fell short of  
 
expressing unequivocal intent to abrogate California’s  
 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. In his dissenting opinion  
 
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, Justice  
 
Brennan attacked the precedent of Hans v. Louisiana arguing  
 
that the case rested on “misconceived history and misguided  
 
logic.” He viewed sovereign immunity as “an anachronistic  
 
and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal system.”102 He  
 
argued that the federal question jurisdiction in the  
 
federal courts under Article III is as broad as the  
 
lawmaking authority of Congress. The Brennan dissent  
 
initiated a major controversy between liberals and  
 
conservatives which continues still. Judge Brennan’s views  
 
reflected those of most academicians.  
 
In the next case, the Supreme Court split four to four  
 
over whether to overrule Hans. 
 
WELCH v. TEXAS DEPT. OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
 
 Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public  
 
Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d  
 
389 (1987) was a case in which an employee of the Texas  
 
state highway and public transportation department was  
 
injured while working on a state-operated ferry dock. She  
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filed suit in the United States District Court for the  
 
Southern District of Texas against the department and the  
 
state under a federal statute that applied the remedial  
 
provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)  
 
(45 USCS 51 et seq.) to seamen and provided that any seaman  
 
who suffered personal injury in the course of his or her  
 
employment could maintain an action for damages at law in  
 
federal court. The District Court dismissed the action as  
 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court of Appeals  
 
affirmed and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of  
 
Appeals ruling that the Eleventh Amendment barred in  
 
personum suits in admiralty against unconsenting states  
 
brought by private citizens and the general language of the  
 
federal statute was insufficient to abrogate the Eleventh  
 
Amendment immunity of Texas. To the extent that Parden was  
 
inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of  
 
Eleventh Amendment immunity must be in unmistakably clear  
 
language, it was overruled. Interestingly, the Court stated  
 
in note 14 that “the principle that States cannot be sued  
 
without their consent is broadly consistent with the Tenth  
 
Amendment.” This foreshadowed the Court’s later ruling in  
 
Alden that sovereign immunity was embedded in the Tenth  
 
Amendment.  
 
69 
 
 
 
 
The Court split four to four on whether to overrule  
 
Hans with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens  
 
being in favor of overruling the case. They quote Professor  
 
John V. Orth of the University of North Carolina School of  
 
Law as follows: "By the late twentieth century the law of  
 
the Eleventh Amendment exhibited a baffling complexity. …  
 
'The case law of the eleventh amendment is replete with  
 
historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and  
 
senseless distinctions.' Marked by its history as were few  
 
other branches of constitutional law, interpretation of the  
 
Amendment has become an arcane specialty of lawyers and  
 
federal judges."103 
 
 The next case is the last Supreme Court case before  
 
Seminole Tribe in which an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment  
 
immunity received judicial approval. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS CO. 
 
 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct.  
 
2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) was an environmental  
 
“superfund” case against Union Gas Co. to recover the  
 
cleanup costs of coal tar pollution of a creek in  
 
Pennsylvania. Union Gas Co. filed a third party complaint  
 
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which it alleged  
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was responsible for some of the cleanup cost. In a  
 
complicated decision, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,  
 
Stevens and Scalia decided the statutory scheme allowed  
 
a suit for money damages in federal court against  
 
Pennsylvania. This raised the issue as to whether Congress  
 
had the authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of  
 
Pennsylvania. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,  
 
Stevens and White ruled that Congress did have such  
 
authority when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  
 
Justice White did not favor overruling Hans, however. In  
 
1996, Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas. 
 
 The next case concerns a suit by an Alaskan native  
 
village against the state of Alaska. This type of suit is  
 
not prohibited by the language of the Eleventh Amendment  
 
due to no diversity of citizenship. 
 
BLATCHFORD V. NATIVE VILLAGE OF NOATAK 
 
 In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.  
 
775, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991), an Alaskan  
 
native village sued the state of Alaska in a dispute over  
 
annual revenue-sharing payments. The Supreme Court in an  
 
Opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Justices Rehnquist,  
 
White, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter held the suit barred  
 
by the sovereign immunity of the state of Alaska. Justice  
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Blackman filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices  
 
Marshall and Stevens.  
 
 Justice Scalia expounds the judicial views which are  
 
the very heart of the so-called federalism revolution of  
 
the Rehnquist Court in the following lengthy quote:  
 
“Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v.  
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L. Ed. 842, 10 S. Ct. 504 
(1890), we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to 
stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition of our constitutional structure which 
it confirms: that the States entered the federal 
system with their sovereignty intact; that the 
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this 
sovereignty, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and 
Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
389, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987)(plurality opinion); 
Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. 
v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 
U.S. 279, 290-294, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 93 S. Ct. 1614 
(1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result); and that 
a State will therefore not be subject to suit in 
federal court unless it has consented to suit, either 
expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’ See Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 
304, 109 L. Ed. 2d 264, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990); Welch, 
supra, at 474 (plurality opinion); Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 87 L. Ed. 2d 
171, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 79 L. Ed. 
2d 67, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).”104  
 
He thus announces the new approach of the conservatives on  
 
the Rehnquist Court to sovereign immunity and the Eleventh  
 
Amendment. The later cases are not much of a surprise after  
 
reading this one carefully. Although Justice Scalia is the  
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great literalist of the Court, he abandoned the plain  
 
meaning of the text approach to interpreting Eleventh  
 
Amendment in Blatchford and instead he gave it a meaning  
 
completely outside its text but within the context of its  
 
historical meaning as overruling Chisholm. The Eleventh  
 
Amendment now means the states entered the Union with their  
 
sovereignty intact, that they now have sovereign immunity,  
 
and no abrogation of that immunity of a state by Congress  
 
will be sustained unless the state expressly waived  
 
sovereign immunity or a waiver by the states was made  
 
within the “plan of the Convention.” This approach to the  
 
Eleventh Amendment is now the law of the United States.  
 
The Indians argued that the traditional principles of  
 
immunity set forth in Hans did not apply to suits by  
 
sovereigns like Indian tribes and even if they did, the  
 
states consented to suits by tribes in the "plan of the  
 
convention." The Court found these arguments to be without  
 
merit. The dissent found the Indians to have a valid  
 
federal cause of action.  
 
 The following case is a suit by the Seminole Tribe  
 
against the state of Florida. The Eleventh Amendment does  
 
not apply as there is no diversity of citizenship.  
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SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA 
 
The sovereign immunity of states was revisited by the  
 
Rehnquist Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44;  
 
116 S.Ct. 1114; 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) in which the  
 
Seminole Tribe of Florida sued Florida and its Governor  
 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C)(part of the Indian  
 
Gaming Regulatory Act enacted pursuant to the Indian  
 
Commerce Clause) to compel good faith negotiations to form  
 
a Tribal-State compact concerning gaming. Such a suit was  
 
provided for by the Act. Florida defended based on  
 
sovereign immunity. At issue was whether the Congress could  
 
abrogate Florida’s immunity from suit. The Court sharply  
 
divided on this issue and in a five to four decision upheld  
 
the sovereign immunity (referred to as Eleventh Amendment  
 
immunity) of the State. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered  
 
the opinion of the Court joined by Justices O’Connor,  
 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a  
 
dissenting opinion. Justice Souter filed a lengthy  
 
dissenting opinion with historical commentary joined  
 
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. The Court held that  
 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity was impossible in  
 
enforcing any clause in the Constitution earlier than the  
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Fourteenth Amendment.105 The Court interpreted the Eleventh  
 
Amendment as including state sovereign immunity following  
 
Blatchford: “Although the text of the Amendment would  
 
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity  
 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, ‘we have understood the  
 
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,  
 
but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’  
 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779,  
 
115 L. Ed. 2d 686, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).”106 The Court  
 
overruled Union Gas: “both the result in Union Gas and the  
 
plurality rationale depart from our established  
 
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the  
 
accepted function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude  
 
that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be,  
 
and now is, overruled.”107 The majority comments on the  
 
dissent as follows: “The dissent, to the contrary,  
 
disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled  
 
together from law review articles and its own version of  
 
historical events. The dissent cites not a single decision  
 
since Hans (other than Union Gas) that supports its view of  
 
state sovereign immunity, instead relying upon the now- 
 
discredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2  
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Dall. 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793). See, e.g., post, at 53, n.  
 
47. Its undocumented and highly speculative extralegal  
 
explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the  
 
Court's traditional method of adjudication.”108 
 
 The dissent of Justice Stevens characterized state  
 
sovereign immunity as a matter of federal common law  
 
modifiable by Congress at its pleasure.109 In an eighty-five  
 
page dissent joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,  
 
Justice Souter asserted that the majority decision suffered  
 
from three critical errors: a misreading of the Eleventh  
 
Amendment, a misunderstanding of how common law doctrines  
 
were received at the Founding, and a misunderstanding of  
 
the “nature of sovereignty in the young Republic.”110  
 
Justice Souter argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not  
 
apply to federal question cases, that the states at the  
 
founding only had a common law sovereign immunity, and the  
 
founders were reluctant to constitutionalize common law  
 
doctrines. Justice Souter’s dissent displays a very  
 
different legal philosophy from his concurrence in  
 
Blatchford five years earlier. 
 
 Following Seminole Tribe was the famous case of Alden  
 
v. Maine in which Justice Marshall’s recommendation in   
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Employees to file federal question cases against states in  
 
state court was tested.  
 
ALDEN V. MAINE 
 
In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706; 119 S.Ct. 2240; 144  
 
L.Ed.2d 636(1999), the plaintiff sued his employer, the  
 
State of Maine, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938  
 
in a state court in Maine as authorized by the federal Act.  
 
This suit was not prohibited under the literal terms of the  
 
Eleventh Amendment. The State of Maine asserted its  
 
sovereign immunity as a defense. The Supreme Court in a  
 
five to four decision ruled in favor of Maine in an opinion  
 
by Justice Anthony McLeod Kennedy joined by Justices  
 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas. Justice Souter  
 
filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens,  
 
Ginsburg, and Breyer. The Court held that Congress could  
 
not abrogate the sovereign immunity of a state by Article I  
 
legislation. Justice Kennedy explained state immunity from  
 
suit in the following words: “The Eleventh Amendment makes  
 
explicit reference to the States' immunity from suits  
 
‘commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States  
 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of  
 
any Foreign State.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 11. We have, as a  
 
result, sometimes referred to the States' immunity from  
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suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ The phrase is  
 
convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the  
 
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor  
 
is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather,  
 
as the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the  
 
authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the  
 
States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the  
 
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the  
 
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain  
 
today (either literally or by virtue of their admission  
 
into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States)  
 
except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain  
 
constitutional Amendments.”111 He argued that the framers  
 
chose a Constitution giving Congress the power to regulate  
 
individuals but not states. The states under the  
 
Constitution had a “residual and inviolable sovereignty.”112 
 
The Eleventh Amendment did not change the Constitution, but  
 
merely overruled the erroneous decision of the Supreme  
 
Court in Chisholm and restored the original constitutional  
 
design. “By its terms, then, the Eleventh Amendment did not  
 
redefine the federal judicial power but instead overruled  
 
the Court.”113 The Article I powers of Congress did not  
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include the authority to subject the states to private  
 
suits as an enforcement method in either state or federal  
 
court. Although Parden and Union Gas held state immunity  
 
could be abrogated by Congress, those cases were wrongly  
 
decided and were previously overruled.  
 
The Alden majority ruled for the first time that the 
 
sovereign immunity of the states was encompassed by the  
 
Tenth Amendment. “Any doubt regarding the constitutional  
 
role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the  
 
Tenth Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the  
 
Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns  
 
about the extent of the national power. The Amendment  
 
confirms the promise implicit in the original document:  
 
‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are  
 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ 
 
U.S. Const., Amdt. 10.”114 
 
Justice Souter dissented joined by Justices Stevens,  
 
Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Souter asserted that “There  
 
is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized  
 
a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent in the notion  
 
of statehood, and no evidence that any concept of inherent  
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sovereign immunity was understood historically to apply  
 
when the sovereign sued was not the font of the law.” He  
 
argued that natural law was the basis of the Court’s  
 
acceptance of state sovereign immunity115: “The Court’s  
 
principal rationale for today’s result, then, turns on  
 
history: was the natural law conception of sovereign  
 
immunity as inherent in any notion of an independent State  
 
widely held in the United States in the period preceding  
 
the ratification of 1788 (or the adoption of the Tenth  
 
Amendment in 1791? The answer is certainly no.”116   
 
 Justice Kennedy responded to the argument that he was  
 
making use of natural law in the following manner: “Despite  
 
the dissent's assertion to the contrary, the fact that a  
 
right is not defeasible by statute means only that it is  
 
protected by the Constitution, not that it derives from  
 
natural law. Whether the dissent's attribution of our  
                                                 
115 Black’s Law Dictionary defines natural law as follows: This 
expression, “natural law,” or jus naturale, was largely used in the 
philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, 
And was intended to denote a system of rules and principles for the 
guidance of human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the 
systems peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the rational 
intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of and conform to 
his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral and physical 
constitution. The point of departure for this conception was the Stoic 
doctrine of a life ordered “according to nature,” which in its turn 
rested  upon the supposititious existence, in primitive times, of a 
“state of nature;” that is a condition of society in which men  
universally were governed solely by a rational and consistent obedience 
to the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such 
nature be as yet undefaced by dishonest, falsehood, or indulgence of 
the baser passions. Maine, Anc.Law, 50 et seq.; Jus Naturale.  
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reasoning and conclusions to natural law results from  
 
analytical confusion or rhetorical device, it is simply  
 
inaccurate. We do not contend the founders could not have 
 
stripped the States of sovereign immunity and granted  
 
Congress power to subject them to private suit but 
 
only that they did not do so. By the same token, the  
 
contours of sovereign immunity are determined by the  
 
founders' understanding, not by the principles or  
 
limitations derived from natural law.”117 
 
 The next case is one concerning the applicability of  
 
the Eleventh Amendment in the context of administrative  
 
law. 
 
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION V. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORTS 
AUTHORITY 
 
 In Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports  
 
Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962  
 
(2002) the Rehnquist Court considered a controversy  
 
concerning South Carolina’s port authority which had denied  
 
a cruise ship permission to berth in Charleston, South  
 
Carolina because its primary business was gambling.  
 
This was a case of first impression as to whether state  
 
sovereign immunity applied in administrative proceedings.  
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The Supreme Court in a five to four decision held that it  
 
did in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas joined by  
 
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.  
 
 The founders did not contemplate the huge federal  
 
bureaucracy that later developed. There are no provisions  
 
in the Constitution relating to the issue of sovereign  
 
immunity in administrative proceedings. Administrative  
 
cases are not judicial proceedings but can be termed quasi- 
 
judicial proceedings. Justice Thomas quoted Hans as ruling  
 
that the Constitution was not intended to “raise up” cases  
 
against states that were “anomalous and unheard of when the  
 
Constitution was adopted.”118 He believed there was great  
 
significance in the fact that there were no private suits  
 
in administrative proceedings at the time of the founding  
 
or for many years thereafter. The earliest such case found  
 
in the briefs filed with the Court did not occur until  
 
1918. The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) had authority  
 
to order payment to an injured private party. If its order  
 
was not obeyed it could assess a civil penalty against  
 
South Carolina of up to $25,000.00 per day. The orders of  
 
the FMC were enforceable in United States District Court  
 
in proceedings in which state sovereign immunity was not a  
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118 Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 
535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002), 755.  
defense. The Supreme Court dismissed the case stating:  
 
“Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion  
 
on state sovereignty at issue in today’s case, we are  
 
nonetheless confident that it is contrary to the  
 
constitutional design.”119 
 
 Justice Stevens dissented arguing that the Eleventh  
 
Amendment restricted the courts’ diversity jurisdiction but  
 
left intact the holding in Chisholm that the Court had  
 
personal jurisdiction over Georgia. Justice Breyer  
 
dissented joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg  
 
stating, “The Court holds that a private person cannot  
  
bring a complaint against a State to a federal  
 
administrative agency where the agency (1) will use an  
 
internal adjudicative process to decide if the complaint is  
 
well founded, and (2) if so, proceed to court to enforce  
 
the law. Where does the Constitution contain the principle 
 
of law that the Court enunciates? I cannot find the answer  
 
to this question in any text, in any tradition, or in 
 
any relevant purpose.”120 Justice Breyer felt the federalism  
 
decisions of the Rehnquist Court unduly restricted  
 
relationships between citizens and states and said:  
 
“Today's decision reaffirms the need for continued  
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dissent.”121 
 
 In the next case, the Court again found an instance in  
 
which the sovereign immunity of the states could be  
 
abrogated by Article I legislation.   
 
CENTRAL VA. COMMUNITY COLLEGE V. KATZ 
 
 Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,  
 
126 S.Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed.2d 945 (2006) concerned a  
 
preferential transfer claim by the Bankruptcy Trustee for  
 
Wallace’s Bookstores, Inc. against Central Virginia  
 
Community College. A preferential transfer is a transfer by  
 
a debtor to a creditor occurring within sixty days of  
 
bankruptcy while the debtor is insolvent and which enables  
 
the creditor to receive more than it would have through a  
 
Chapter 7 liquidation. Although the Court in Seminole Tribe  
 
had held that Congress could not abrogate the sovereign  
 
immunity of a State by Article I legislation, it carved out  
 
an exception in the case of preferential transfers in  
 
bankruptcy. In 1787, various states had bankruptcy laws  
 
generally providing that a debtor could receive a discharge  
 
upon turning over all his property to the bankruptcy  
 
trustee. A problem arose in that some debtors who had  
 
surrendered all their property and received a discharge of  
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their debts then suffered imprisonment by other states for  
 
debt. Some states refused to extend comity (legal  
 
recognition) to bankruptcy discharges of other states. The  
 
Constitution provided for the establishment of a federal  
 
bankruptcy system that would be uniform throughout the  
 
United States and avoid the problem of one state not  
 
extending comity to the bankruptcy laws of another.  
 
Congress implemented the first permanent federal bankruptcy  
 
law in 1898. However the majority, in an Opinion written by  
 
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices O’Connor,  
 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer believed that history taught  
 
an intent on the part of the founders to waive state  
 
sovereign immunity in this circumstance. The states waived  
 
immunity by ratifying the Constitution or joining the  
 
Union. The argument made was almost the same as the  
 
prevailing one in Union Gas, but involved the bankruptcy  
 
laws rather than the Commerce Clause. Justice O’Connor, in  
 
one of her last cases before retirement, switched sides and  
 
joined the liberal wing of the Court in this instance. 
 
 Justice Thomas dissented joined by Justices Roberts,  
 
Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Thomas was not impressed by 
 
the argument that the framer’s intended to abrogate state  
 
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases stating: “The  
 
majority's action today ... is difficult to comprehend.  
85 
 
 
 
 
 
Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the  
 
Constitution indicates that the Bankruptcy Clause, in  
 
contrast to all of the other provisions of Article I,  
 
manifests the States' consent to be sued by private  
 
citizens.”122 
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122 Central Va. Community v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 126 S.Ct. 990, 163 
L.Ed.2d 945 (2006), 1014. 
CHAPTER VII. STATES SUED IN ANOTHER STATE’S COURT 
 
 In Paulus v. South Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867  
 
(1924) the plaintiff suffered an injury in a coal mine in  
 
North Dakota operated by South Dakota. He sued South Dakota  
 
in a North Dakota state court. The North Dakota Supreme  
 
Court ruled that South Dakota was immune from suit without  
 
its consent.  
 
 The United States Supreme Court declined to follow the  
 
precedent of Nathan and Paulus in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.  
 
410; 99 S.Ct. 1182; 59 L.Ed.2d (1979) in which Nevada was  
 
sued in a California state court for a motor vehicle  
 
accident in California involving a Nevada-owned vehicle on  
 
official business. Nevada lost the case and was ordered to  
 
pay $1,150,000.00. The Court would not extend comity to a  
 
Nevada statute limiting damages to $25,000. In a six to  
 
three decision the United States Supreme Court ruled that  
 
sovereign immunity did not protect Nevada and that  
 
California was not required to extend Full Faith and Credit  
 
to the Nevada statute limiting damages. Justice John Paul  
 
Stevens wrote the majority Opinion joined by Justices  
 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell. Justice  
 
Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice  
 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist wrote a  
 
dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger. This  
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case at first seems anomalous and inconsistent with the  
 
sovereign immunity rulings of the Rehnquist Court. The main  
 
problem is there is little in the Constitution regulating  
 
the behavior of states towards each other. As the law  
 
stands now, for a state to recognize the sovereign immunity  
 
of another state there must be an agreement, either express  
 
or implied, between them or a voluntary decision by the  
 
forum state to extend comity to the sovereign immunity of  
 
the other state. Prof. Ann Woolhandler has published a  
 
study of the law in this area in which she argues that Hall  
 
was wrongly decided.123 
 
 Chief Justice John Marshall, for a unanimous Court,  
 
decided Indian nations are sovereignties within the United  
 
States in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 8 L. Ed.  
 
25 (1831). Issues of sovereign immunity have arisen with  
 
respect to Indian nations and political subdivisions of  
 
states.  
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University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series. University of 
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CHAPTER VIII. INDIAN NATIONS HAVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BUT 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF STATES DO NOT 
 
 In United States v. United States Fidelity Co., 309 US  
 
506, 60 S. Ct. 653; 84 L. Ed. 894 (1940) the United States  
 
Supreme Court in an Opinion by Justice Stanley Reed ruled  
 
that Indian nations had sovereign immunity and could not be  
 
sued except as provided by an act of Congress. With respect  
 
to political subdivisions of states such as counties and  
 
municipalities, the rule of sovereign immunity does not  
 
apply.  
 
 Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 10 S. Ct. 363,  
 
33 L. Ed. 766 (1890) was an action against Lincoln County  
 
to pay bonds and coupons. A unanimous Court in an Opinion  
 
by Justice David Josiah Brewer ruled that Eleventh  
 
Amendment immunity applies only to states themselves and  
 
not their political subdivisions. This was a weak case for  
 
a sovereign immunity defense as Lincoln County did not have  
 
immunity under Nevada state law.  
  
 The issue of county immunity was revisited by the  
 
Court in Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Chatham County, 547  
 
U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 164 L. Ed. 2d 367, (2006). In  
 
this case a drawbridge operated by the County fell and  
 
collided with a boat. The Court held, in a unanimous  
 
Opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that the County was not  
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acting as an arm of the state in operating the drawbridge  
 
and was not clothed with immunity from suit.  
  
 There is one way in which state sovereign immunity can  
 
be penetrated. This is in an action filed by the United  
 
States. 
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CHAPTER IX. THE UNITED STATES CAN SUE A STATE 
 
 The United States can sue a state and the state’s  
 
sovereign immunity is not a defense. The first such case  
 
was United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211, 10 S.Ct.  
 
920; 34 L.Ed. 336 (1890) although the immunity issue was  
 
not raised. In United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621; 12  
 
S.Ct. 488; 36 L.Ed. 285 (1892), Texas asserted the  
 
sovereign immunity defense. The Supreme Court ruled that it  
 
had original jurisdiction of the case. It is settled law  
 
that the United States can sue a state in either state or  
 
federal court and state sovereign immunity is no bar.  
 
 The sovereign immunity of the United States has not  
 
been seriously questioned other that by Justice James  
 
Wilson. 
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CHAPTER X. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing indicated in  
 
dicta in Chisholm that the United States had sovereign  
 
immunity. Justice Wilson made it clear that no republican  
 
government, in his opinion, had sovereign immunity. Chief  
 
Justice Marshall in dicta in Cohens v. Virginia said, “the  
 
universally received opinion is that no suit can be  
 
commenced or prosecuted against the United States.”124 In  
 
United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286; 11 L.Ed. 977 (1846)  
 
the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that the  
 
United States had sovereign immunity. The United States  
 
could not be sued or ordered to pay court costs without its  
 
consent. This has been the invariable rule ever since.  
 
Sovereign immunity for the federal government is  
 
undoubtedly correct and of a constitutional nature as  
 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states in relevant  
 
part: “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in  
 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Justice Scalia  
 
dissenting in Union Gas stated  
 
Undoubtedly the Constitution envisions the necessary 
judicial means to assure compliance with the 
Constitution and laws. But since the Constitution does 
not deem this to require that private individuals are 
able to bring claims against the Federal Government 
for violation of the Constitution or laws, see United 
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-402 (1976); U.S. 
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Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (‘No Money shall be drawn 
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law’), it is difficult to see 
why it must be interpreted to require that private 
individuals be able to bring such claims against the 
States. If private initiation of suit against the 
offending sovereign as such is essential to 
preservation of the structure, it is difficult to see 
why it would not be essential at both levels. Indeed 
if anything it would seem more important at the 
federal level, since suits against the States for 
violation of the Constitution or laws can at least be 
brought by the Federal Government itself, see United 
States v. Mississippi, supra, at 140-141. In providing 
federal immunity from private suit, therefore, the 
Constitution strongly suggests that state immunity 
exists as well.”125  
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125 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed. 
2d 1 (1989)33-34. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is indeed hard to fathom why the States and the  
 
Federal government should have different rules with respect  
 
to sovereign immunity. They are equal participants in the  
 
Federal system. The Supreme Court, except in Chisholm, has  
 
consistently ruled that the states have sovereign immunity  
 
although many of the decisions have been by sharply divided  
 
courts. Our history shows that state sovereign immunity was  
 
of constitutional stature from the ratification of the  
 
Articles of Confederation until the present time. The Court  
 
has fashioned an Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence including  
 
state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment has been  
 
interpreted in many ways over the years and has a very  
 
complex and confusing case law. Prof. Jesse H. Choper  
 
commented about the Eleventh Amendment case law as follows: 
 
“The Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has  
 
come in for heavy scholarly criticism. It has been called  
 
unconstitutional, anachronistic, based on discredited legal  
 
principles, and inconsistent with constitutional text,  
 
structure, and history. It is fair to say that, in general,  
 
scholarship in the federal courts area has been critical of  
 
the justifications for the doctrine of state sovereign  
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immunity, even in its pre-Rehnquist Court incarnations.”126 
 
The history of sovereign immunity given early in this  
 
thesis should help to clarify the understanding of this  
 
concept. The future for sovereign immunity and the Eleventh  
 
Amendment could be rocky. Justice David Hackett Souter  
 
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer in Alden  
 
says as much,  
 
The resemblance of today's state sovereign immunity to 
the Lochner era's industrial due process is striking. 
The Court began this century by imputing immutable 
constitutional status to a conception of economic 
self-reliance that was never true to industrial life 
and grew insistently fictional with the years, and the 
Court has chosen to close the century by conferring 
like status on a conception of state sovereign 
immunity that is true neither to history nor to the 
structure of the Constitution. I expect the Court's 
late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal 
of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one 
being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, 
and probably as fleeting.”127  
 
Justice Stevens joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,  
 
and Breyer was of the opinion that some recent federalism  
 
decisions of the Court were not entitled to respect,  
 
deference, or stare decisis:  
 
I remain convinced that Union Gas was correctly 
decided and that the decision of five Justices in 
Seminole Tribe to overrule that case was profoundly 
misguided. Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am 
unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling 
precedent. First and foremost, the reasoning of that 
                                                 
126 Jesse H. Choper, Essay: Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh  Amendment? The 
Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 Colum. L. 
Rev. 213 (2006), 214. 
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opinion is so profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally 
inconsistent with the Framers' conception of the 
constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to 
the usual deference or respect owed to decisions of 
this Court. Stare decisis, furthermore, has less force 
in the area of constitutional law. ... The kind of 
judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole 
Tribe, Alden v. Maine, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
144 L. Ed. 2d 575, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), and College 
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627, 144 L. Ed. 2d 575, 119 S. 
Ct. 2199 (1999), represents such a radical departure 
from the proper role of this Court that it should be 
opposed whenever the opportunity arises.”128  
 
One should hope that the law in this area would  
 
stabilize and be determined by legal rather than political  
 
considerations. 
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